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IT Risk Disclosure, Governance and Compliance:
complementary or conflicting agendas?

Abstract
In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission mandated disclosure in an organization’s annual
report of significant risks that may adversely affect the company. We examine the risk disclosures of the
largest 100 U.S. firms over the period 2004-2006 to determine the extent of coverage of IS/IT risks. We
find that IS/IT risks represent less than 4% of total risks disclosed and that 40% of companies do not
address a single IS/IT risk. An analysis of disclosures by industry suggests evidence of normative or
mimetic isomorphism. We conclude that IS/IT risks are underreported or under-analyzed, giving financial
statement users a false sense of IS/IT security.

I.

Introduction

In 2005, Canada‘s Hudson Bay Company suffered a $33.3 million loss following the failure
of a new computer based inventory system. Ford‘s abandonment of a purchasing system at a cost
of $400 million in 2004 and the cancellation of the $170 million FBI Virtual Case File paperless
system in 2003 both highlight the complexity and significance of risk in computer systems
development and operation (Charette 2005, Chua 2009) and in Enterprise Resource Planning
implementation failures. The consequences that follow poor or missing risk management in
information systems projects are universally unprejudiced: they occur in every country; they
affect large organizations and small; commercial, non-profit and governmental, and they have
little regard for status or reputation.
Individually and collectively these examples highlight the complexity and unpredictability of
the risk factors intrinsic to information systems and information technology (IS/IT). The
accelerating pace of IS/IT innovation only serves to amplify the potential for failures. The
financial services industry highlights this potentiality. The range and sophistication of financial
products, services, relationships and regulations have both increased in lock-step with the
dynamic, innovative e-commerce systems that support them. An extensive network of complex
business processes and interrelationships with regulators, customers, and other institutions
characterize contemporary financial services. Any disruption to the IS/IT infrastructure that
enables these processes and relationships will reverberate throughout this service chain (Zhu,
Kraemer and Dedrick 2004). Although the financial services industry was, and remains, in the
forefront of IS/IT innovation, organizations in most other sectors of the economy have adapted
or adopted similar capabilities and technologies, creating a web of interconnectivity amongst
themselves and their customers. Today IS/IT is fundamental to the exchange of goods, services,
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and information in the increasingly diverse global marketplace. IS/IT have become mission
critical to many organizations: to that end, the financial services sector provides a useful
exemplar of the characteristics of that dependence. As an increasingly wide range of
organizations continue to invest time and resources in strategically important IS/IT, managing
the risk associated with them becomes a critical area of concern.
The examples above also suggest that IS/IT risks are frequently overlooked, misunderstood
or ignored and consequently underappreciated and undervalued (Wallace, Keil and Rai 2004,
Kumar 2002, Osmundson, Michael and Machniak 2003). Soberingly, a study by the Project
Management Institute shows that risk management is the least practiced of all project
management disciplines across all industry sectors, and that nowhere is it less frequently applied
than in the IS/IT industry (Charette 2005). Without effective risk management, neither managers
responsible for IS/IT development and deployment nor those in business units where the systems
are used have any substantial insight into what may go wrong, why it may go wrong, and what
they may do to eliminate or mitigate the risks. However, when these risks materialize, the high
dependence of business operations on IS/IT often leads to their threatening a wide range of
organizational processes, disciplines and divisions. IS/IT have become mission critical to
commercial enterprises, as our examples show. Simultaneously, the scope, complexity, and
opacity of these risks increases as complex, enterprise-spanning applications are integrated and
information systems migrate to more sophisticated technology platforms such as Web2.0 and
‗clouds‘ that are increasingly abstract from the day-to-day experience of workers on the shop
floor, trading floor or other physical setting where they are used. As these risks become reality,
they result in harm to not only customers, vendors, and creditors; they ultimately injure the
equity owners of the business. These rapidly increasing risks and management‘s difficulty in
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identifying and addressing them prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
mandate risk disclosure for all U.S. publicly traded companies in 2005. 1,2
The primary goal of the SEC is to protect external parties (i.e. the public); one method is to
regulate disclosures so that these external parties (e.g. investors, creditors, and vendors) have the
information necessary to make informed decisions about doing business with a particular
company. Although it provides a comprehensive framework designed to accommodate
registrants in all sectors of the economy, Regulation S-K supports a holistic perspective of
organizational risk, requiring disclosure of risks that are specific and perhaps unique to the
registrant (company) rather than superficial or ‗broad brush‘ analyses that identify only general
business or industry risks. Such a holistic perspective of risk and risk management is a key
means by which to improve regulatory oversight.
In this exploratory study, we analyze the U.S. Fortune 100 companies‘ 10-K 1a risk
factor disclosures in the years 2004-2006. We propose and answer research questions related to
the frequency, proportion, ranking, and change over time of IS/IT risk factor disclosures. We
also explore whether there are differences between industries. We use the Trust Services
Framework to further analyze the nature of IS/IT risk disclosures, coding them in relation to
security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, or privacy.
We find that over the three years 2004-2006, IS/IT risks represent less than 4% of the
total risks disclosed in the SEC 10-K filings. Approximately 40 percent of the companies in our
sample report not a single IS/IT risk. These figures suggest one of two possibilities. Either,
despite the frenzied media coverage that follows failures such as those noted earlier,
management overlooks, misunderstands, undervalues, or ignores IS/IT risks; or management
1

The SEC approved Item 503 (c) under Regulation S-K on June 29, 2005. It is effective for issuers with fiscal year
ends following December 15, 2005 (Securities and Exchange Commission 2004, 2005).
2
These companies are also referred to as registrants.
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recognizes these risks but does not report them in the 10-K filing. We suggest that the second
option is unlikely, given the continued reports of costly system failures. We believe it is more
likely that the low disclosure rates are a consequence of a rather superficial appreciation of the
reporting and disclosure requirements. Rather than view regulation S-K as an opportunity to
embrace risk management as a means to improve corporate performance, management views the
disclosures as a compliance issue. By following the letter, rather than the spirit of the regulation,
companies themselves and external parties are shortchanged. We explore institutional
isomorphism as the theoretic basis for this behavior.
The remainder of the paper falls into six sections. The literature review in Section II
elaborates our motivation for this research and explains the development of our research
questions: these are set out in Section III. Section IV presents our results. In Section V, we
discuss our findings, limitations of our study, and some implications for future research.

II.

Literature Review

Although organizations have practiced some form of risk management for decades, the
spotlight has intensified in recent years, as stakeholders demand more information about key
organizational risks. Since 1997, the SEC has required organizations to disclose quantitative and
qualitative information about market risk exposures from financial instruments (Securities and
Exchange Commission 1997). However, IS/IT failures such as those discussed by Charette
(2005), together with the corporate accounting scandals and business collapses of the early
2000‘s, clearly showed that organizations face many other types of risks. Thus, the SEC
implemented stronger regulations relating to risk disclosure in corporate annual and quarterly
reporting. Regulation S-K was intended to alert investors and others to the wide range of risks
4

involved in owning, loaning to, or doing other business with public companies. The regulation
requires that companies list and discuss―…the most significant factors that may adversely affect
the issuer‘s business, operations, industry, or financial position, or its future financial
performance‖ within their 10K filing (Securities and Exchange Commission 2004, 2005) . The
SEC identifies three broad categories of risk factors: industry risks (e.g., an inability to acquire
raw materials or to meet production demands); company risks (e.g., an inability to acquire
software technology or consequences from unionized labor strikes); and investment risks (e.g.,
inability to pay dividends or a lack of a liquid market for securities) (Securities and Exchange
Commission 1999). It is important to note that the SEC included the caveat ―where appropriate‖
in the description guiding risk factor disclosures. Doing so allows management to decide what
risk factors it will disclose, and when it will disclose them.
The S-K regulation is relatively new: consequently, little research exists about the types
of risks organizations choose to disclose. This paper takes a first step by exploring corporate
disclosures regarding IS/IT issues. We focus on these disclosures because information systems
underlie virtually every process in business today. The efficiency and effectiveness of internal
business operations and compliance with external reporting regulations have long since been
dependent upon the IS/IT infrastructure (Rainer, Snyder and Carr 1991). Dependence on
increasingly complex technologies has redefined corporate risk, creating the potential for
problems that may produce outcomes ranging from inconvenience to catastrophe (Barton,
Shenkir and Walker 2002, Loch, Carr and Warkentin 1992, Meall 1989, Stoneburner, Goguen
and Ferlinga 2002).
Researchers have long recognized IS/IT as a primary concern in the uncertain and risky
business environment. A recent review of the literature cited hundreds of articles, dating back 30
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years, that discuss IS/IT risks (Sherer and Alter 2004). Those risks continue to proliferate. The
rapid pace of technological advancement, increased interconnectivity, and complex enterprise
spanning systems expose organizations to greater risks from business interruption, process
interdependency and systems security breaches than ever before (O'Leary 2000, Hunton, Wright
and Wright 2004, Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2004).
Earlier regulatory reforms enacted in the wake of Enron and other business failures
further increased management‘s attention to IS/IT risks. Indeed, inadequate systems controls
were cited as a chief source of material weaknesses in SEC filings upon the implementation of
SOX and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board requirements (Solomon 2005).
Increasing awareness of and sensitivity to the importance of identifying and managing systems
risk prompted President Obama to call for the creation of a cyber security czar to protect the
nation‘s digital infrastructure from hackers (Simpson and Cole 2009).
Few businesses are immune to IS/IT risks. Once thought to be the concern of traditionally
high-risk industries such as medicine, defense and airlines, IS/IT dependence is now a critical
issue for all sectors of the economy (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2004). Studies
place the estimate of companies that have experienced major control failures or systems security
breaches at 60% to 80% (e.g., (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2004, Romney and
Steinbart 2009). Increasing speed and decreasing costs explain the ubiquity of IS/IT and, in turn,
the accelerated innovation and growth of information-based products and services. Such growth
has been particularly significant in the financial services sector (see, for instance Zhu, Kraemer
and Dedrick 2004).
Prior research shows that, despite their ubiquity, user communities and management tend
to pay less attention to the contribution of IS/IT once they are in operation: IS/IT have become
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commoditized and taken for granted (Carr 2003). Consequently, mission criticality often
becomes masked by the normal operation of the systems, which themselves become part of the
undiscussed social routine of contemporary organizational life. Clearly, businesses are keenly
aware of the opportunities presented by the growing reach of ‗e-commerce‘. It is our contention
that the ever-increasing diversity and complexity of intra- and inter-organizational IS/IT systems
gives rise to an unrealized degree of dependence on them, and perhaps an underappreciated
range of ‗e-risks‘.
The examples in our introduction show that the tangible and intangible costs of these
risks and failures can be high. Tangible costs include items such as lost sales, materials and
labor, broken contracts, legal liabilities, and lost market value (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu and
Raghunathan 2004). Loss of consumer confidence, damage to supplier and partner relationships,
and exposure of proprietary secrets are difficult if not impossible to quantify. Clearly, this reality
makes IS/IT risks a primary concern for accountants, auditors, IT professionals, and managers,
whose job it is to manage risk.
Several groups such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have addressed the
need for integration of risk factors into comprehensive management strategies that facilitate not
only risk identification, but also diagnosis and treatment through the development of risk
mitigation, business continuity and disaster recover policies. However, results from a recent
survey show that ―there is an urgent need to evaluate existing risk management processes in the
light of perceived increases in the volume and complexity of risks and ‗operational surprises‘
experienced (Beasley, Branson and Hancock 2009, 20).
Despite Regulation S-K and advice to adopt a more holistic approach to risk oversight,
disclosure, and management, Beasley et al. note that ―…not all organizations are modifying their
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procedures for identifying, assessing, managing and communicating risk information to key
stakeholders (op cit, p2). Even though 62% of their respondents indicated that the volume and
complexity of risks had changed ‗extensively‘ or ‗a great deal‘ in the last 5 years, ―the level of
risk management sophistication remains fairly immature for most respondents‖ (op cit, pp 9 and
19). They go on to report that most organizations appear to lack some of the most fundamental
methodologies that would allow them to develop a consistent and reliable view of risk.
The absence of such methodologies or other guidance suggests the existence of a void or
discontinuity in the risk management process: this is characterized by the reported unstructured,
ad hoc communication of risks within organizations. Regulations such as S-K appear directed at
this void, providing a means to modify procedures in response to risks that are identified and
disclosed. Our research explores the extent to which Regulation S-K has filled the void.

III. Research Questions
IS/IT Risk Disclosure Pervasiveness
Our first set of research questions explores the frequency and proportion of IS/IT risks
disclosed in the year prior to the regulation (2004), the year of implementation (2005) and the
first full effective year (2006).
RQ1a: What is the frequency of IS/IT risk disclosures?
RQ1b: What proportion of total risk disclosures relate to IS/IT?
Recent studies, particularly one by Beasley et al (2009), suggest that management views
risk disclosure primarily in terms of compliance, rather than as an opportunity to institute a
holistic risk management process. Our second set of research questions explores the validity and
significance of this inference.
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If, as the research summarized above suggests, risk disclosure is attenuated by the
communication vacuum or void found in many organizations, the effect of regulations such as SK may not be those intended by their authors, giving rise to a paradox: in the absence of an
internally consistent and reliable view of risk, managers in organizations might use the S-K
regulation as a surrogate for more comprehensive, locally relevant procedures for identifying
risk.
Institutional Theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) highlights the paradox faced by
regulators. Although clearly a step forward in filling the void and formalizing ad hoc
communication about risk, regulations such as S-K can have unanticipated consequences in the
absence of organizationally specific (and therefore relevant) strategies and processes.
If seen as a time-specific, one-off compliance action, risk disclosures might, over time,
homogenize rather than diversify to reflect the growing range of risks intrinsic to IS/IT in
business. Such homogeneity arises as institutions, and the people who manage them, seek
legitimacy. Clearly, such a quest could be prompted by regulations such as S-K. Homogenization
within and between organizations is driven by three pressures: coercion, mimesis, and norms.
Coercive pressures result from dependence on other entities such as bureaucratic agencies and
powerful constituencies. Organizations gain legitimacy by meeting the directives of these bodies.
Mimetic pressures develop when uncertainty in the environment encourages the imitation of
practices or actions taken by peer organizations. By mimicking other ‗successful‘ firms, the
organization gains a degree of legitimacy. Normative forces result from the desire to conform to
norms standardized by professional organizations and corresponding educational requirements.
In this case, individuals (i.e., managers) provide a sense of legitimacy by meeting the entrance
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requirements of peers within the same profession. Managers become homogenized or
interchangeable because of similar backgrounds, experience, and training.
Following Lai et al (2006), we explore changes in IS/IT risk factor disclosures in order to
gather evidence about the homogeneity of these corporate disclosures. Based on our knowledge
of increasing dependence on and complexity of information systems, and the related risks
accompanying those increases, we should observe concomitant increases in IS/IT risk
disclosures. Failure to observe these increases supports the institutional isomorphism effect, and
thus supports the contention that managers are responding to the regulation with compliance
behavior, conforming to the letter, rather than the spirit of the law, and that institutional
isomorphism explains this compliance-oriented behavior.
RQ2a: Has the frequency of IS/IT risk disclosures changed over time?
RQ2b: Has the proportion of IS/IT risk disclosures changed over time?
Industry Differences
The variation between industry sectors is the degree to which they depend on IS/IT to
support core business processes provides an additional important and orthogonal indicator of the
homogeneity discussed above. The substantial prior research on IS/IT investments (including
Kohli and Devaraj, 2004; Demirhan et al, 2005; Bhatt and Grover, 2005; Bardhan et al, 2004 and
2006; Zhu, Kraemer and Dedrick, 2004) focuses at the organizational and process levels.
Comparison of IT investment between industry sectors is not easy to assess using these
measures. We anticipate that companies in highly regulated industries that depend heavily on
IS/IT to support their core business processes are likely to report more IS/IT risk factors than
companies in less-regulated, less IS/IT dependent industries. For example, we would expect
companies in financial services, health care and telecommunications to report more IS/IT risk
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factors than companies in manufacturing, tourism and oil and gas. We pose the following
questions to explore the differences between the prevalence of IS/IT risk disclosure between
industry sectors and their relative significance.
RQ3a: Is there significant variation between industry sectors on the frequency of
IS/IT risks disclosed?
RQ3b: Does the relative significance of IS/IT risks disclosures vary between industry
sectors?

Trust Services Framework
After exploring the frequency, proportion, and changes over time related to IS/IT risk factor
disclosures we conduct additional analyses on those disclosures to understand the types of risks
actually reported. Wallace et al. (2004) highlights the paucity of suitable categorical schemes to
support the classification of IS/IT risks. Although a range of checklists and other frameworks
have been proposed ―…there are relatively few tools available to help project managers identify
and categorize risk factors in order to develop effective strategies‖ (Wallace, Keil and Rai 2004,
115). Recently, comprehensive governance frameworks such as CobiT (Control Objectives for
Information Related Technology) have emerged to supplement predecessors such as COSO (the
Treadway Commission's Committee of Sponsoring Organizations). CobiT has become widely
used to assess the internal controls and overall corporate governance of an institution (Tuttle and
Vandervelde, 2007). One of the 34 high-level CobiT processes addresses the assessment and
management of IT risk. However, although CobiT has 215 specific and detailed control
objectives throughout these 34 high-level IT processes, its evolution as a governance mechanism
did not lend itself to our classificatory objectives.

11

The more recent Trust Services Framework, developed jointly by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
(CICA), is a set of core principles and criteria that directly address the reliability of a company‘s
information technology and systems (AICPA and CICA 2006). In addition to providing a robust
and well-known typology of risk categories, the Trust Services Framework provides a means to
accommodate and categorize risk disclosures from all sectors of the economy, not just banking
and financial services. The framework identifies five fundamental principles that focus on
individual aspects of systems controls and governance. Security, the first principle, forms the
foundation of the framework and supports the other four principles (Romney and Steinbart
2009). It addresses controls and policies that are designed to protect the IS/IT operations and
development processes from unauthorized access. The remaining four principles are availability,
processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy. Availability refers to the accessibility of the
system for processing, monitoring, and maintenance. Processing integrity addresses the
completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of system processing. Confidentiality refers to the
protection of organizational information designated as confidential (e.g. business plans, customer
lists, internal pricing). Finally, privacy focuses on the protection of information an organization
holds regarding its customers, suppliers, and employees. Together, the five principles contribute
to the ultimate goal of achieving systems integrity and minimizing systems risk exposures
(AICPA and CICA 2006).
The Trust Services principles were developed to attune organizations to the risks posed by
their IS/IT environment (AICPA and CICA 2006). The increasing dependence on IS/IT in every
aspect of an entity‘s operations is matched only by the increasing concern over the systems‘
reliability. All variety of stakeholders, including boards of directors, creditors, regulators,
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business partners, and customers, rely on IS/IT for timely and relevant information. Yet,
reliability remains a question for even the best-designed systems. The CICA (Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants 2009) notes that the complexity of todays IS/IT systems make them
―breeding grounds for errors and other compromises to data‖ (p1). Furthermore, because the
systems are interconnected, errors in one entity‘s system travel downstream, well beyond the
boundaries of the entity (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 2009). The Trust Services
Framework provides professional guidance for identifying and addressing these risks (Coe
2005).
We use this framework to classify the data, deepening our understanding of the distribution
of disclosed risks among the five principles. (Examples of risk disclosures categorized by Trust
Services principles are provided in Appendix B). It is important to recognize the fundamental
characteristic of the Framework that all five principles must be addressed in order to ensure
systems reliability. Because most experts agree that it is impossible to eliminate the risks
addressed in the Trust Services Framework entirely (Romney and Steinbart 2009), we might
expect that entities would recognize risks pertaining to each area. Our final research questions
examine this expectation and explore whether this distribution has changed since the regulation
was enacted. We look for evidence of changes in the distribution to determine if companies are
addressing more (or less) of the IS/IT risk spectrum as the regulation matures. With a view to
understanding the motivation guiding these disclosures, we ask:
RQ4a: What is the distribution of IS/IT risk factor disclosures among the five Trust
Services principles?
RQ4b: Has the distribution of IS/IT risk factor disclosures among the five Trust
Services principles changed over time?
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IV.

Results

We select our sample by identifying the Fortune 100 companies (based on total sales) for the
year 2004 (see listing in Appendix A). We limit our analysis to these companies for three
reasons. First, these companies likely have the resources and competency required to engage in
enterprise risk management, second, they are more likely to be under the SEC‘s watchful eye,
increasing extent of compliance likelihood, and third, other firms are likely to view their actions
as setting a standard or norm for reporting decisions. We eliminate five mutual insurance
companies that are not publicly traded, leaving an initial sample of 95 firms. In order to
appropriately address our research questions, we then follow these 95 firms over the three year
period, 2004-2006. We believe this method best allows us to analyze the changes in risk factor
disclosures over the three-year period surrounding the mandate. During this period, four of the
firms merged into one firm, further reducing the sample. Three of the firms merged in 2005, with
the fourth merging in 2006. Thus, our sample of 95 firms in 2004 (the year prior to the
introduction of Regulation S-K) is reduced to 93 firms in 2005 and 92 firms in 2006 (the first full
year of operation).
We downloaded the company name, industry code, total average assets, total average sales,
and Fortune rank from the Compustat database. Then we located and hand-collected the text and
rank from each Item 1a of each company‘s 10-K for the related year.3 We built a relational
database to store all data. Two graduate assistants independently coded the data as follows:
1 – Indicate whether each risk factor was IS/IT related.
2 - If a factor was IS/IT related, code it as related to one or more of the Trust Services
Principles (based on a short description provided).
3

Rank indicates the sequential order in which risk factors appeared. While companies do not generally number
factors, they often appear in a list format.
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Inter-rater agreement was 97.2% on whether each risk factor was IS/IT related. Within the set
of IS/IT risk factors identified by both raters, inter-rater agreement on coding of the risk factors
into the Trust Services Principles was 87.3%. Inter-rater reliability was found to be Kappa =
0.941, which represents a very high level of agreement (Landis and Koch 1977). Differences
were resolved through review and discussion between one of the researchers and an independent
party who teaches Accounting Information Systems courses at a large university.
We examined 280 10-K reports, resulting in the collection of 3,795 individual risk factors
from the three-year period: 2004, 2005, and 2006. Participation in 2004 was lowest, with only 65
companies reporting risk factors. By 2005 and through 2006, all companies in our sample
reported at least one risk factor. The average number of risk factors per company per year
increased slightly, from 13.28 in 2004 to 16.27 in 2006, as did the maximum number of risks per
company, from 41 to 48. The distribution of risk factors over the three years appears in Table 1
below.
===================Table 1 about here =====================
The frequency distribution of all risk disclosures during this period reflects the upward trend
in Table 1. However, it is interesting to note the modest increase in the number of registrants
reporting higher numbers of risk factors (Figure 1).
====================== Figure 1 about here ======================
Turning to the data specific to IS/IT risk disclosures that address research question 1a, we
find that the prevalence of IS/IT risk disclosures is relatively low – with 18 companies reporting
at least one IS/IT risk factor in 2004, 47 in 2005, and 55 companies reporting at least one IS/IT
risk factor in 2006 (see Table 2). Table 2, Panel A summarizes data that respond to research
question 2a, regarding the change in frequency over time. Over the period 2004-2006, we note a
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steady increase in both the total number of risk factors reported, as well as an increase in the total
number of companies reporting at least one IS/IT risk factor, as noted earlier. In 2004, the year
before the mandate, only 18.9 percent of Fortune 100 regulation S-K eligible companies reported
at least one IS/IT risk factor. That percentage increased to 50.5 percent in 2005, and 59.8 percent
in 2006. Nevertheless, the absence of any IS/IT risk factor disclosure from over 40 percent of the
largest companies filing under regulation S-K is surprising.
We explored this issue more deeply: the data that address research questions 1b and 2b - the
percentage of IS/IT-related disclosures to all risk disclosures are summarized in Table 2, Panel
B. The data reveal that although risk disclosures overall are increasing, those related to IS/IT
represent a relatively small portion (3.7 percent of all risks disclosed over the three year period).
This proportion has increased slightly over time - from 2.1 percent of the total risk factors
disclosed in 2004 to 3.3 percent in 2005 and 3.7 percent in 2006. Although the proportion of
IS/IT risk factor disclosures has increased, this increase is from a very low initial threshold and
does not appear to reflect the large increase in IS/IT risks we observe in practice.
We also note that IS/IT risks consistently appear later in disclosures than non-IS/IT risks,
measured as the average location of IS/IT risk factors, compared with the average location of
non-IS/IT risk factors (Table 2, Panel B). The overall average rank of non-IS/IT risks factors is
10.5, while the overall average rank for IS/IT risk factors is 13.0. While rank is not necessarily
indicative of risk importance, absent objective processes for risk ranking (e.g. alphabetical,
functional area), rank is decided by someone at some time, and thus provides information about
management‘s choices.
======================Table 2 about here =========================
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Next, we evaluate the data at the industry level to answer research questions 3a and 3b,
regarding industry differences in the frequency and proportion of IS/IT risks disclosed. Table 3
lists the specific industries that had at least one company report IS/IT risks as at least 10 percent
of their total risks reported (2004-2006). Of the 56 industries represented in the Fortune 100, six
qualified. Presented in Table 3, these industries in descending order (percentage of total risk
factors that are IS/IT-related) represent Finance and Radio, TV, and electrical stores (25 percent),
department stores (13.3 percent), hospital and medical service plans (12.4 percent), general
medical and surgical hospitals (11 percent), and plastics (11 percent). It is not surprising that
department stores, which are heavily dependent on IS/IT for revenue generation, purchasing,
record keeping, and distribution, recognize more IS/IT risks. Likewise, financial services and
hospitals, whose operations heavily depend on IS/IT, are also closely regulated, making
disclosure even more likely. What is disconcerting is that 50 industries out of 56 (89 percent) list
fewer than 10% of their risks as IS/IT-related. These industries include telecommunications,
insurance, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and computers (including software). While we
acknowledge that companies in these industries may be able to mitigate some risks through
avoidance or sharing, it is likely that some IS/IT risks remain. Further, a review of the data finds
that 27 industries (48 percent) had no companies list even one IS/IT risk. These industries (total
risk factors listed for 2004-2006) include computer programming and data processing (106),
public warehousing (86), guided missiles and space vehicles (51), television broadcasting (50),
and meatpacking (43).
===================== Table 3 about here ==========================
The summary data in Table 4 shows variation between industry groupings and provides
additional insight into industry differences. The data represents average risk rank for IS/IT risks
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disclosed in the S-K filings. The data have been sorted: lower values (towards the top of the
table) indicate that those risks are ranked earlier in the risk disclosure. For example, computer
and software wholesalers list IS/IT risks earlier in the disclosure, while computer communication
equipment retailers list those risks later. In response to research question 3b, it appears as though
the relative significance of risk disclosures varies between industry sectors, however, we discern
no predictable pattern.
===================== Table 4 about here ========================
Our final analysis relates to the nature of IS/IT disclosures, research questions 4a and 4b,
using coding based on the Trust Services Framework. It should be noted that an individual risk
factor could relate to more than one principle (e.g. the risk of system failure could relate to
processing integrity and availability).
In response to research question 4a, the distribution among the five Trust Services
principles is weighted toward risks that threaten system availability (69 risks, 57.5 percent of all
IS/IT related risks). Following availability, security threats are mentioned 61 times (50.8
percent), with processing integrity threats not far behind, with 60 (50 percent). Threats to
confidentiality, 22 (18.3 percent) and privacy, 20 (16.7 percent) are the least frequently
mentioned. We summarize these findings in Table 5.
==================== Table 5 about here =======================
Companies may report availability threats most frequently because IS/IT availability is a
necessary component to system function. Since many business processes rely on IS/IT, if those
systems are down, none of the processes may proceed. In IS/IT-dependent businesses,
unavailable systems prevent revenue from being earned and/or collected, payroll from being
processed, bills from being paid, and a host of other activities from continuing. Compared with
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the other threats, system availability is clearly the most significant. However, despite the clear
prevalence of these risks in our analysis, we believe that they are still significantly underrepresented. Two factors prompt this observation. Firstly, our findings in response to RQ2b, rate
of change over time, suggest substantial under-reporting of these risks. Secondly, we find it
difficult to comprehend how managers within industries that are ostensibly ‗risk free‘ according
to their disclosures - computer programming and data processing, guided missiles, and
meatpacking - are unaware of their businesses critical dependence on high integrity IS/IT. This
suggests that the risks themselves have been insufficiently analyzed in-house and are therefore
under-appreciated, exacerbating the low rate of reporting. This concurs with Benaroch et al
(2006) who found that managers in a financial services setting relied on intuition to assess IT
investment risk rather than any formal method or framework.
Processing integrity threats and security threats each represent about one-half of total
IS/IT threats reported. Both may result in errors in business processes or accounting, leading to
losses related to inaccurate data, loss of customer confidence, and expenditures to correct errors.
Companies report risks associated with confidentiality and privacy least frequently. There
are several potential explanations for this finding. First, companies may not recognize these
threats as serious, second, they may have taken measures to mitigate these risks, and third, they
may not want the public to know that these threats exist.4 Figure 2 presents risk factors by
principle as a percentage of total IS/IT risk factors over time. In response to research question 4b,
changes in distribution over time, we observe that confidentiality and privacy are increasing as a
percentage of total IS/IT risk factors over the three-year period.5 This may indicate an increase in

4

We acknowledge that these risks may be singular, and therefore companies may adequately discuss them in a
single disclosure, however, one could say the same for other types of risks.
5
None of the major privacy regulations were enacted during the time period we examined. The Financial
Modernization Act was implemented in 1999 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act was first
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corporate awareness of these two types of IS/IT risks, however, the data show that reporting of
availability and processing integrity risks is declining, perhaps suggesting some sort of trade-off
of risk awareness.
==================== Figure 2 about here =========================

Post-Hoc Analysis: Financial Characteristics
We also considered whether there were differences in certain financial characteristics of
IS/IT risk reporting versus non-reporting companies. While we acknowledge there is little
financial variation in the Fortune 100 companies, we explore the possibility of uncovering
significant differences in total assets and/or total sales. Statistical analysis (non-tabulated) reveals
that neither total assets nor total sales are statistically significantly different between reporters of
IS/IT risks and non-reporters.

V.

Discussion, Future Research, and Limitations

We find that IS/IT risks are generally under-analyzed (or underreported) by
organizations, giving investors; creditors; customers and the public at large a rather naïve (and
false) sense of security. Although our modest sample size makes generalizations rather
speculative, we are surprised by the low rates of IS/IT risks presented by the top US companies.
Indeed, close to half of the Fortune 100 companies do not acknowledge any risk exposure related
to their own critical infrastructure.
Although an important addition to the regulatory process and an alternative lens through
which to maintain oversight, the S-K regulation limits itself. It is a uniform medium: this is both
a strength and a weakness. The strength of regulatory uniformity arises from codification,
enacted in 1996 and revised in 2003. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act was finalized in 2008. This act
protects the privacy of student educational records, and does not affect the companies in our sample.
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methodization, and systematization – the presentation of order. The weakness is the tendency for
users of the regulation to conform rather than inform – that is to say, to comply with the minutiae
of the regulation, rather than use the regulatory framework as a guide to investigate, explore and
expand the representation to accommodate known and emerging risks.
In order for companies to comply with regulation S-K, it is essential that they develop a
comprehensive, organizationally relevant risk management strategy. Without such a strategy, it is
impossible to effectively identify and manage their IS/IT in ways that fully meet the S-K
mandate.
The failure to comprehensively integrate risk factors into management strategy and
thereby support a truly effective governance mechanism prompts Linsley and Shrives (2006) to
suggest that risk disclosures are regarded a function of conformation rather than compliance:
that organizations ―…may just be conforming to a quasi-norm whereby larger companies believe
they should disclose more information, risk or non-risk‖. Their observations resonate with our
characterization of Regulation S-K and other instruments being adrift in a strategy void or
vacuum. The uniformity and codification of S-K and other regulatory instruments become an
ends rather than a means to an end. In this situation, regulatory instruments act like cages rather
than frameworks.
Haunschild and Miner (1997) suggest that in situations of uncertainty, social factors
substitute for technical criteria and imitation takes the place of investigation and independent
choice . While companies may be able to identify and quantify some risks, uncertainty about
limitless other potential occurrences remains. Companies may respond to this uncertainty
through the mechanisms of institutional isomorphism. In striving to conform and comply,
organizations seek legitimacy; coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures affect the
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interpretations and behaviors of those charged with disclosure. Most significantly, in our view,
coercive pressure may encourage compliance with the letter of the law rather than the spirit of
the law. Rather than use the disclosure mandate as an opportunity to inform themselves about the
efficacy of their organization‘s risk management strategy and processes, and investors and others
of the risks acing the organization, registrants appear to have taken a compliance approach In
sum, management discloses risk factors because the SEC mandates they must disclose risk
factors, not because they aim to inform investors, or even improve their own management
approach.
Our findings related to industry difference indicate the influence of mimetic and
normative pressures. The data are more homogenous than we would anticipate for such a diverse
range of industries: the absence of any IS/IT risk disclosure in some industries may be the result
of organizations mimicking the disclosure practices of others. In uncertain environments,
organizations will mimic other organizations because they perceive safety in numbers. This
makes intuitive sense: if an organization discloses a risk that a main competitor does not, does
the disclosing organization become more risky in the eyes of the investor? By mimicking the
practices of intra-industry peers, an organization can avoid this perception. The homogeneity in
our data may also be explained by normative isomorphism, which predicts that managers within
similar professions develop similar perceptions or frames of reference: managers within an
industry are likely to have the same background and experiences, consequently their decisions on
disclosure may become consistent.
We also find an increase in confidentiality and privacy-related risk disclosures, at a cost
to availability and processing integrity disclosures. This shift may represent a response to media
reports and regulatory pressures regarding identity theft and corporate espionage. However,
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mimetic pressures may also be a cause of this increase – resulting in generalized disclosures that
do little to help investors understand the unique risks facing a particular company.
Our use of institutional isomorphism to explain some of our findings is rather
speculative: further investigation is warranted. However, it is clear from the disclosure practices
we report that the effectiveness of the S-K regulation is open to question. The objective of the
regulation is to provide information to investors and other external parties regarding the risk
exposure of an organization. Our results cast doubt on whether organizations are truly informing
- identifying risks, exploring their causes and effects, putting in pace processes and strategies to
mitigate them and advising regulators and investors of their actions; or are merely conforming disclosing the minimum required to comply with regulation S-K. Greater transparency in the
regulatory process, as proposed by Simpson and Cole (2009), may address this issue, making
organizations more accountable internally, and promoting more comprehensive and open
reporting that, in turn, will benefit both shareholders and regulators.
In addition to highlighting the challenges that face the writers and users of regulations,
this paper makes important initial contributions to our understanding of the managerial and
regulatory challenges that surround the use of large-scale integrated IS/IT in corporate America.
We demonstrate that the Trust Services framework provides a robust means of classifying IS/IT
risk factors that can be used to differentiate their incidence and significance. The initial use of
this approach in this paper suggests that it could be used in future research to explore the
differences between industry sectors (alluded to in Table 4) and organizations within sectors
(Table 3) in order to more fully understand the range, nature and significance of the risks posed
by IS/IT systems.
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Further research is warranted to examine whether isomorphic forces have resulted in the
homogenization of firms‘ risk disclosures. Are disclosures boilerplate, or do they truly identify
risk factors unique to the particular firm? Boilerplate disclosures do not provide the most
relevant or valuable information for the investor: failure to optimally use the S-K regulation to
guide investigation, exploration and disclosure about IS/IT risks contributes to information
overload, masking the potential of the disclosure process to guide management strategy and
action. Experimental research offers a suitable methodology for examining the informational
effect of the risk disclosures on both management decision making and investor decisions.
Investigation of how firms make their disclosure choices and who is responsible for making them
can also help us understand the potential motivations or incentives for the disclosures.
Finally, this paper contributes to the scant body of research on risk factors, and
particularly, on risk factor disclosure. A handful of studies have investigated general risk-related
disclosures in U.K. and Canadian public companies (Linsley and Shrives 2006, Linsley, Shrives
and Crumpton 2006) and value-at-risk disclosures in U.S. commercial banks (Jorion 2002).
Dobler (2008) reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analytically discuss risk
reporting incentives. To the best of our knowledge, however, no other published paper has
examined the risk factor disclosure regulation. Our paper is a first attempt to address this gap.
We are unable to conclude definitively why the majority of organizations in our sample
do not disclose any IS/IT risks. The question remains whether companies do not recognize the
risk, whether they recognize but do not disclose the risk, or whether they mitigated the risk such
that no disclosure was necessary. Each of these possibilities represents challenges and potential
problems for the organization and its stakeholders. If companies do not recognize risks, the
potential for catastrophic effects is unchecked. If they recognize but do not disclose, the

24

regulation has failed to achieve its goal and investors are unaware of a potentially serious
exposure. Lastly, companies that feel no need to disclose because the IS/IT risk has been
mitigated must be viewed skeptically. As most IS/IT experts agree, it is inherently impossible to
fully remove risk from IS/IT systems because of the speed of technology innovation. Future
research, particularly surveys or field experiments, offers an avenue to find answers to these
questions.
Limitations
The availability and reliability of data relating to Fortune 100 companies provides us with a
robust dataset with which to explore our research questions. However, three factors limit this
advantage. Firstly, we restrict our sample size to the 100 largest U.S. public companies. While
this sample spans a wide variety of industries, it is not inclusive of all industries. Additionally,
we cannot generalize results to small or mid-sized companies. Secondly, the SEC‘s risk factor
disclosure regulation is relatively new. Over time, companies may dramatically change the
number and/or level of detail in their disclosures. While we have presented three years worth of
data, future research should continue to observe and analyze this data, providing a longitudinal
perspective. Finally, by restricting our analysis to IS/IT risks, we cannot comment on the
appropriateness of corporate risk disclosure in other areas (e.g., financial, environmental,
marketing). However, because IS/IT is a rapidly changing field, both with respect to innovation
and diffusion; companies are continuously encountering new related risks, and we would have
expected companies to include these risks in their public disclosures.
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APPENDIX A
Listing of Sample Companies – 2005 Fortune 100 (based on 2004 reports)
1 Walmart

34 Dow Chemical
Albertson's (sold to
35 Supervalu on June 2, 2006)
36 Morgan Stanley
37 MetLife
38 Walgreen
39 United Technologies
40 United Health Group
41 Microsoft
42 United Parcel Service

67 Sprint
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

New York Life Insurance
Viacom
International Paper
Johnson Controls
Tyson Foods
Caremark
JC Penney
Honeywell

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Ingram Micro
Best Buy
FedEx
Alcoa
HCA
TIAA-CREF
Sunoco
Mass Mutual Life
Merck
St. Paul Travelers
Duke Energy
BellSouth
Hartford Financial

23 AmerisourceBergen

Lowe's
Archer Daniels Midland
Sears Roebuck
Safeway
Lockheed Martin
Medco Health Solutions
Motorola
Intel
Allstate
Wells Fargo
Merrill Lynch
Walt Disney
CVS
AT&T (merged with #33
56 SBC to form AT&T Inc)

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

89 Weyerhaeuser
MCI (merged with Verizon, last
90 filing 12/29/04)
91 Cisco
92 Coca-Cola
93 Bristol-Myers Squibb
94 Lehman Brothers
95 Electronic Data Systems
96 Plains All American Pipeline
97 Wellpoint
98 News Corp

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Exxon
General Motors
Ford
GE
Chevron
ConocoPhillips
Citigroup
AIG
Intl. Business
Machines
Hewlett-Packard
Berkshire Hathaway
Home Depot
Verizon
McKesson
Cardinal Health
Altria
Bank of America
State Farm Insurance
JP Morgan Chase
Kroger
Valero Energy

Pfizer
Boeing
Procter & Gamble
Target
Dell
Costco Wholesale
Johnson & Johnson
Marathon Oil
Time Warner
SBC
Communications
(Merged with AT&T
33 in 11/05)

Caterpillar
Northrop Grumman
Goldman Sachs
Sysco
PepsiCo
American Express
Delphi
Prudential Financial
Wachovia

66 DuPont

99 Nationwide Insurance
100 Abbott Laboratories

Dropped from original sample (insurance companies)
Merged or failed in 2005
Merged in 2006
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Appendix B
Examples of Risk Disclosures categorized by Trust Services Principles
Principle

Security

Availability

Processing integrity

Risk Disclosure Example
If we are unable to protect our information systems against data corruption, cyber-based attacks or
network security breaches, our operations could be disrupted.
We are increasingly dependent on information technology networks and systems, including the
Internet, to process, transmit and store electronic information. In particular, we depend on our
information technology infrastructure for digital marketing activities and electronic
communications among our locations around the world and between Company personnel and our
bottlers, other customers and suppliers. Security breaches of this infrastructure can create system
disruptions, shutdowns or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. If we are unable to
prevent such breaches, our operations could be disrupted or we may suffer financial damage or loss
because of lost or misappropriated information.
Infrastructure failures could harm our business. We depend on our information technology and
manufacturing infrastructure to achieve our business objectives. If a problem, such as a computer
virus, intentional disruption by a third party, natural disaster, manufacturing failure, or telephone
system failure impairs our infrastructure, we may be unable to book or process orders, manufacture,
and ship in a timely manner or otherwise carry on our business. An infrastructure disruption could
cause us to lose customers and revenue and could require us to incur significant expense to
eliminate these problems and address related security concerns. The harm to our business could be
even greater if it occurs during a period of disproportionately heavy demand.
We outsource and obtain certain information technology systems or other services from
independent third parties, and also delegate selected functions to independent practice associations
and specialty service providers; portions of our operations are subject to their performance.
Although we take steps to monitor and regulate the performance of independent third parties who
provide services to us or to whom we delegate selected functions, these arrangements may make
our operations vulnerable if those third parties fail to satisfy their obligations to us, whether
because of our failure to adequately monitor and regulate their performance, or changes in their
own financial condition or other matters outside our control. In recent years, certain third parties to
whom we delegated selected functions, such as independent practice associations and specialty
services providers, have experienced financial difficulties, including bankruptcy, which may
subject us to increased costs and potential network disruptions, and in some cases cause us to incur
30

Confidentiality

Privacy

duplicative claims expense.
Certain legislative authorities have in recent periods also discussed or proposed legislation that
would restrict outsourcing and, if enacted, could materially increase our costs. We also could
become overly dependent on key vendors, which could cause us to lose core competencies if not
properly monitored.
The success of our business depends on maintaining a well-secured pharmacy operation and
technology infrastructure.
We are dependent on our infrastructure, including our information systems, for many aspects of our
business operations. A fundamental requirement for our business is the secure storage and
transmission of personal health information and other confidential data. Our business and
operations may be harmed if we do not maintain our business processes and information systems,
and the integrity of our confidential information. Although we have developed systems and
processes that are designed to protect information against security breaches, failure to protect such
information or mitigate any such breaches may adversely affect our operations. Malfunctions in our
business processes, breaches of our information systems or the failure to maintain effective and upto-date information systems could disrupt our business operations, result in customer and member
disputes, damage our reputation, expose us to risk of loss or litigation, result in regulatory
violations, increase administrative expenses or lead to other adverse consequences.
An increase in account data breaches and fraudulent activity using our cards could lead to
reputational damage to our brand and could reduce the use and acceptance of our charge and credit
cards.
We and other third parties store Cardmember account information in connection with our charge
and credit cards. Criminals are using increasingly sophisticated methods to capture various types of
information relating to Cardmembers‘ accounts, including Membership Rewards accounts, to
engage in illegal activities such as fraud and identity theft. As outsourcing and specialization
become a more acceptable way of doing business in the payments industry, there are more third
parties involved in processing transactions using our cards. If data breaches or fraud levels
involving our cards were to rise, it could lead to regulatory intervention (such as mandatory card
reissuance) and reputational and financial damage to our brand, which could reduce the use and
acceptance of our cards, and have a material adverse impact on our business.
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Figures and tables for inclusion in the body of the manuscript
Table 1
Total Risk Factors by Year
Number of
companies
Mean number
reporting at
of risks per
least one
company
risk factor
65
13.28
93
15.43
92
16.27

Number of
risk factors
2004
2005
2006

863
1435
1497

Standard
Deviation

Range

8.67
8.23
8.55

1-41
1-42
1-48

Frequency of Total Risk Factors
# of Companies

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1-10

11-20

21-30

31-48

Number of Total Risk Factors per Company
2004

2005

2006

Figure 1
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Table 2
Prevalence of IS/IT Risk Disclosures
Panel A

Year
2004
2005
2006

Number of companies
reporting at least one
IS/IT risk
18
47
55

Total Number of
Companies
95
93
92

Percentage of
companies reporting at
least one IS/IT risk
18.9%
50.5%
59.8%

Panel B

a

Year

Number of individual
risks

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

2004
2004
2004

18
845
863

Percentage
of total
risks
2.1
97.9
100

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

2005
2005
2005

47
1388
1435

3.3
96.7
100

12.4
10.4

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

2006
2006
2006

55
1442
1497

3.7
96.3
100

13.1
10.9

IS/IT Risks
Non-IS/IT Risks
Total

Total
Total
Total

120
3675
3795

3.2
96.8
100

13.0
10.5

Average
rank a
14.4
10.0

Calculated by sequentially numbering each risk in the company‘s disclosure. Lower numbers indicate higher ranking.
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Table 3
Specific Industries with Companies Disclosing IS/IT Risks Greater than 10% of Total Risks
Total of 2004, 2005, and 2006
IS/IT
Non-IS/IT
Percentage of
Industry
risks
risks
Total risks
total risks that
(a)
(b)
(c)
are IS/IT (a/c)
FINANCE-SERVICES
12
36
48
25.0%
RADIO,TV,CONS ELECTR STORES
6
18
24
25.0%
DEPARTMENT STORES
2
13
15
13.3%
HOSPITAL & MEDICAL SVC PLANS
11
78
89
12.4%
GEN MED & SURGICAL
HOSPITALS
6
48
54
11.1%
PLASTIC MATL,SYNTHETIC RESIN
2
17
19
10.5%

Table 4
Average Risk Rank for Disclosed IS/IT Risks,
by General Industry Groupings (NAICS)
NAICS

Industry Description

423430
523110
334111
336322
517110
522291
444110
452111

COMPUTERS & SOFTWARE-WHSL
COMMERCIAL BANKS
ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS
MOTOR VEHICLE PART,ACCESSORY
PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE
FINANCE-SERVICES
LUMBER & OTH BLDG MATL-RETL
DEPARTMENT STORES

Average
IS/IT Risk
Rank
4.33
4.50
5.33
6.00
6.00
6.00
7.00
7.50
34

523110
622110
3252
443112
515210
325412
492110
311930
445110
522320
424210
452990
524114
446110
324110
3341
511210
524113
33611
524126
334220
334119

SECURITY BROKERS & DEALERS
GEN MED & SURGICAL HOSPITALS
PLASTIC MATL,SYNTHETIC RESIN
RADIO,TV,CONS ELECTR STORES
CABLE AND OTHER PAY TV SVCS
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS
AIR COURIER SERVICES
BEVERAGES
GROCERY STORES
FINANCE-SERVICES
DRUGS AND PROPRIETARY-WHSL
VARIETY STORES
HOSPITAL & MEDICAL SVC PLANS
DRUG & PROPRIETARY STORES
PETROLEUM REFINING
COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIPMENT
PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE
LIFE INSURANCE
MOTOR VEHICLES & CAR BODIES
FIRE, MARINE, CASUALTY INS
RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ
COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP
Overall Average

8.00
8.83
9.00
9.00
9.50
9.86
10.00
10.40
10.67
12.00
12.38
13.75
16.09
16.50
18.00
18.33
20.00
20.50
23.00
23.17
29.67
30.00
12.84
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Table 5
IS/IT Risk Factor Categorization based on Trust Services Framework
# of factors (maximum of each type per company)
Year

Totals
IS/IT
Disclosures/Categories

Availability

Security

Processing
Integrity

Confidentiality

Privacy

2004
2005
2006

18
11 (1)
7 (1)
9 (1)
1 (1)
2 (1)
47
30 (2)
26 (2)
27 (2)
9 (1)
9 (2)
55
28 (2)
28 (2)
24 (3)
12 (2)
9 (1)
120/232(100%)*
69(30%)
61(26%)
60(26%)
22(9%)
20(9%)
* Individual risk factors may address multiple areas – thus the total number of risk factors is less than the total number of risks by
factor.
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Distribution of IS/IT Risk Factors Among Trust Services Principles
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

2004

10%

2005

0%

2006

Trust Services Principle
Figure 2
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